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A B S T R A C T
During social interactions, people tend to automatically align with, or mimic their interactor’s facial expressions,
vocalizations, postures and other bodily states. Automatic mimicry might be implicated in empathy and af-
filiation and is impaired in several pathologies. Despite a growing body of literature on its phenomenology, the
function and underlying mechanisms of mimicry remain poorly understood. The current review puts forward a
new Neurocognitive Model of Emotional Contagion (NMEC), demonstrating how basic automatic mimicry can
give rise to emotional contagion. We combine neurological, developmental and evolutionary insights to argue
that automatic mimicry is a precursor to healthy social development. We show that (i) strong synchronization
exists between people, (ii) that this resonates on different levels of processing and (iii) demonstrate how mimicry
translates into emotional contagion. We conclude that our synthesized model, built upon integrative knowledge
from various fields, provides a promising avenue for future research investigating the role of mimicry in human
mental health and social development.
1. Introduction
In environments with many rapidly changing elements, brains
provide an evolutionary advantage for survival by allowing organisms
to extract patterns of information that aid predictions (Adolphs, 2001).
Humans, like many other social animals, live in groups. On the one
hand, groups can offer better prospects for survival by communication
and cooperation, but on the other hand, group members can also form a
threat within a group as they can free-ride or exploit other group
members (de Dreu et al., 2010; de Dreu et al., 2016). As a consequence
of responsiveness to one's own behavior, compared to the physical
environment, the social environment is relatively unpredictable. De-
spite its complexity, humans are often readily able to intuit others’
feelings and also understand and even anticipate others’ actions. This is
done seamlessly, without effort, and often without conscious awareness
(Dimberg et al., 2000; Tamietto and Castelli, 2009; Tamietto and de
Gelder, 2010; Kret et al., 2013a,b; Wood et al., 2016). The remarkable
capacity to share others’ affective states and empathize with others is
the key characteristic of many of humanity's modern achievements. The
development of social cognition is closely related to the development of
emotional and affective communication between an infant and his or
her mother (Adolphs, 2001; Francis et al., 1999; Simpson et al., 2014).
Social capacities can be extremely sensitive to even small differences in
the environment (Crabbe et al., 1999). When infants are born, their
verbal and motor abilities are still very limited and their communica-
tion relies mainly on subtle social cues from their environment.
The current literature argues that a potential mechanism that allows
humans to recognize (Neal and Chartrand, 2011; Stel and van
Knippenberg, 2008; Wood et al., 2016) and share emotions is automatic
mimicry (Decety and Lamm, 2006; Schuler et al., 2016; Singer and
Lamm, 2009). Automatic mimicry is defined as the unconscious or
automatic imitation of speech and movements, gestures, facial expres-
sions and eye gaze (for an extensive review see Chartrand and van
Baaren, 2009). The tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize
movements with those of another person has been suggested to con-
sequently result in emotional contagion (Cacioppo et al., 2000). Al-
though the focus in the literature has been predominantly on the mi-
micry of facial expressions or bodily postures (motor mimicry),
evidence is accumulating that humans mimic on many more levels than
the muscle movements alone. For example, this is demonstrated by the
synchrony of heart-rate and pupil-diameter during social interactions,
the tendency to blush when an interaction partner blushes and the
contagiousness of crying or yawning (for a review, see Kret, 2015;
Palumbo et al., 2016). During the present review, we refer to the mi-
micry or synchronization on this more autonomic level as ‘autonomic
mimicry’. Even though autonomic mimicry might have important
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consequences for social behavior (i.e. Kret et al., 2015; Kret and de
Dreu, 2017), it is an understudied topic in the field of social neu-
roscience and is therefore one of the key topics of this review.
In two different ways, this article aims to provide a new perspective
on the role of automatic mimicry in the development of empathy. First,
by building upon the perception-action model (PAM) of empathy
(Preston and de Waal, 2002), the current review integrates mimicry
studies coming from multiple scientific disciplines, ranging from de-
velopmental psychology, evolutionary biology and neuroscience in
order to explain how automatic mimicry gives rise to complex social
cognition. The second aim is to introduce a new Neurocognitive Model
of Emotional Contagion (NMEC), which incorporates these additional
autonomic pathways to explain how empathic abilities emerge from a
dynamic synchronous activity between two interacting brains. The
NMEC is a multidisciplinary conceptual model explaining mimicry on
different levels of processing through which affective information can
be shared. This model has laid out how information passes from a
sender's face or body to a receiver's brain and subsequently to their face
or body, and how the transition of perceptual inputs builds emotional
understanding. The purpose of this review is not to provide a complete
literature overview of all the mimicry studies that have been conducted
(for an extensive review, see Chartrand and Dalton, 2009; Chartrand
and van Baaren, 2009; Chartrand and Lakin, 2013; Kret, 2015; Palumbo
et al., 2016). Instead, through the integration of evidence from various
fields, we aim to provide novel insights into the role of automatic mi-
micry in the development of human socio-cognitive functions.
2. Definitions and terminology
2.1. Different types of automatic mimicry
First, we define the mimicry terms that we will be using. Although
we are fully aware of the fact that ‘what is pure mimicry and what is
not’ is a matter of debate and there are some gray areas, the present
review uses the term ‘automatic mimicry’ as an umbrella term for the
different types of synchronous behaviors. A distinction in automatic
mimicry will be made between ‘motor mimicry’ controlled by the motor
muscles which are partly implicit but can also be consciously con-
trolled, and ‘autonomic mimicry’ which relies on an unconscious sig-
naling system that is controlled by the autonomic nervous system (ANS)
(Fig. 1). For example, ‘motor mimicry’ occurs when two or more people
engage in the same behavior within a short time window (typically
between 3 and 5 s), and includes mimicry of motor movements such as
facial expressions (Dimberg et al., 2000; Niedenthal et al., 2001), body
postures (Tia et al., 2011), vocal characteristics (Gregory and Webster,
1996; Webb, 1969), contagious yawning (Helt et al., 2010), speech
gestures (Goldin-Meadow and Alibali, 2013) and laughter (Estow et al.,
2007). The second type of automatic mimicry, ‘autonomic mimicry’
involves any associative pattern in the physiologies of interacting
partners, such as synchrony in heart rate (Feldman et al., 2011),
breathing rhythm (Creaven et al., 2014; Van Puyvelde et al., 2015),
pupil diameter (Fawcett et al., 2016; Kret et al., 2015; Kret and de Dreu,
2017) and hormonal level (Laurent et al., 2012; Saxbe et al., 2014).
2.2. Emotional contagion
Observation of emotional expressions has been shown to elicit not
only motor and autonomic mimicry but also corresponding emotional
responses (Hatfield et al., 1994). The literature refers to this type of
emotional mimicry as to ‘emotional contagion’. Emotional contagion is
defined as the tendency to take on the sensory, motor, physiological
and affective states of others (Hatfield et al., 1994). Hatfield et al.
(1994) argued that one of the main mechanisms underlying emotional
contagion is automatic mimicry (synchronization of expressions, vo-
calizations, postures and movements with those of another person).
When people unconsciously mimic their partner's expressions of emo-
tion, they come to feel reflections of those emotions as well. It is im-
portant to note that while emotional contagion is related to mimicry, it
is not the same phenomenon. Emotional contagion is a multilevel
phenomenon that can arise from several types of mimicries occurring at
different levels of processing (sensory, motor, physiological and affec-
tive). For example, if someone mimics our facial expressions, it does not
necessary mean that he or she is experiencing the same emotional state
as we do. This is because the affective component from motor muscles
alone may not always extend to full emotional experience, that is, the
psychological feeling associated with it. For example, while facial
muscles’ feedback may help an observer to correctly attribute emo-
tional valence of an expression, a visceral arousal may be necessary to
fully emotionally converge (Laird, 1974). In other words, emotional
contagion is a higher cognitive/emotional construct that is not ne-
cessarily tied to one specific mimicry form.
3. The evolution of empathy
Many theories share common definitions of empathy. Much dis-
agreement in the field is the result of scientists failing to agree on what
specific psychological processes empathy encompasses. We adapt the
working definition of empathy based on the idea that empathy consists
of two main processes:
Emotional contagion/hot empathy: the tendency to take on the
Fig. 1. Schematic Representation of Empathy Development: (1) The sender's (mother's) emotional state is reflected in her nonverbal motor movements (facial expressions, body postures,
and eye-gaze) and physiological responses (heart rate, hormonal levels, sweating, facial color, pupil diameter). (2) The perception of a target's state instantly activates the observer's
(child’s) neural representations that are also active during the first-hand experience of that same state (shared neural activation). (3) Shared neural activation in turn activates somatic and
autonomic responses resulting in motor mimicry & autonomic mimicry. (4) Automatic mimicry facilitates physiological and motor feedback inducing emotion in the receiver (emotional
contagion). (5) This helps observer to understand sender's mental state better (empathy).
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sensory, motor, physiological, and affective states of others (Hatfield
et al., 1994).
Mentalizing/Perspective taking/cold empathy: a mental process
that enables humans to take another's perspective and relate to other
people's emotions, thoughts and intentions (Decety and Svetlova,
2012).
The first one is rather primitive, automatic, implicit, and un-
controllable form of empathy which is also the main focus of this re-
view.
3.1. From mimicry to emotional contagion (Fig. 1)
According to Preston and de Waal’s (2002) perception-action model,
the most basic form of empathy is emotional contagion, which is the
tendency to take on the sensory, motor, physiological and affective
states of others. A theory developed by Hatfield et al. (1994) proposed
that emotional contagion is a result of multiple psychological and be-
havioral phenomena. This is because emotional contagion can be pro-
duced by a complex social stimulation (e.g., a mother giving a verbal
compliment/criticism to her child), or a more innate nonverbal sti-
mulus (e.g., mother's positive/negative facial expressions towards her
infant). In both cases, these expressions are likely to result in emotional
contagion (an affective transfer between the mother and the infant). An
example of a display of emotional contagion is an experiment where
one mouse receives an electrical shock accompanied by a tone whilst
being observed by another mouse. Eventually, the mouse that has been
merely observing the scene also freezes in response to the tone, even
though the mouse itself has never experienced the sensation of an
electrical shock (Panksepp, 1998). The genetic background has an im-
pact on the level of these responses (Chen et al., 2009). In animals, this
phenomenon is also called ‘observational learning of fear’ (for a review,
see Olsson and Phelps, 2007). Other evidence, for example, comes from
studies in great apes whereby the apes start yawning when they see
conspecifics yawn (Anderson et al., 2004). Contagious yawning has also
been found in budgerigars (Miller et al., 2012). The basic idea is that by
observing others, species vicariously learn from their conspecifics to
readily adapt the same state as conspecifics, which in turn have survival
benefits.
When infants are born, their verbal and motor abilities are still very
limited and their communication relies mainly on subtle social cues
from their environment. This is why during early development, emo-
tional understanding is likely to take the ‘bottom-up’ route (de Waal
and Ferrari, 2010). It has been suggested that humans have evolved
communicative faces with a smooth skin, large eyes and red lips which
ease communication and therefore fostered cooperation (Tomasello
et al., 2005). During face to face interactions (Fig. 1), the mother's
emotional state is reflected in her nonverbal motor movements (facial
expressions, body postures, and eye-gaze) and her physiological re-
sponses (heart rate, hormonal levels, sweating, facial color and pupil
diameter). Infants, similarly to other animals, implicitly pick up these
subtle social signals from caregivers’ faces and bodies. This in turn has
an impact on infants’ own physiology and cognition.
Research in social neuroscience suggests that observation of another
person's emotional state automatically activates the same neural re-
presentation of that affective state in the observer, along with auto-
nomic and somatic responses related to them (Anders et al., 2011;
Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Goldman and Sripada, 2005; Keysers and
Gazzola, 2010). Scientists referred to this as ‘neural resonance’ or
‘brain-to-brain coupling’ and have documented that this is a robust and
consistent phenomenon in emotion perception studies (Anders et al.,
2011; Jackson et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2006b; Keysers and Gazzola,
2009; Lloyd et al., 2004; Prehn-Kristensen et al., 2009). Wood et al.,
(2016) explained that when people observe a facial expression of
emotion, they themselves experience partial activation in the corre-
sponding neural populations, which may (or may not) result in auto-
matic mimicry of the emotional expression. According to the facial
feedback theory, mimicking facial expressions of emotion helps to re-
cognize the emotional expression of the observed person (Buck, 1980).
Through the afferent feedback from one’s own muscle movements and
changes inarousal, automatic mimicry helps infants to feel what their
caregiver is feeling and to better understand a caregiver’s mental states.
Moment by moment, subjective emotional experiences are affected
from such mimicry (Hatfield et al., 1994). This suggests that mimicry
might be a precursor to a more general mind-reading capacity. Whereas
some have ascribed advanced social capacities observed in humans to
the development of language (Astington and Baird, 2005; Astington and
Jenkins, 1999), other authors propose that social cognition begins with
earlier and more basic and nonverbal characteristics that precede lan-
guage development (Asada et al., 2001; Preston and de Waal, 2002). In
the current review, we argue that the development of empathy begins
with the innate drive to implicitly mimic and emotionally align with
others.
Fig. 1 shows that when people mimic a perceived facial expression,
they partially activate the corresponding emotional systems in them-
selves. Automatic mimicry and shared neural activation reflect on the
underlying sensorimotor simulation that supports the corresponding
emotion. Since emotions involve behavioral, physiological and cogni-
tive components, activation of one component automatically activates
other components (Wood et al., 2016). In return, mimicry provides a
basis for inferring the underlying emotion of the expresser (Buck,
1980). Instead of the brain being a ‘stimulus–response’ system activated
by a specific type of emotion (anger, happiness, fear), the brain rather
functions as a generative system which constructs others’ emotions as
affective information gathered over time. While the visual information
(e.g. pupil size, facial redness) gives a description of the visible affective
components, it does not provide a full understanding of the other's
emotional state. For that conjunction, a variety of autonomic input is
essential to evaluate past experiences to predict the posterior prob-
abilities that serve as a prediction about the observed expression.
3.2. From emotional contagion to cognitive empathy
Theories of empathy make a distinction between emotional con-
tagion (the primitive form of empathy) and the more cognitive, “so-
phisticated” processes such as cognitive empathy (Decety and Lamm,
2006; Preston and de Waal, 2002). The key argument for such a dis-
tinction is that if empathy is a purely bottom-up process without in-
hibitory processes (based on the perception-action loop), then emo-
tional contagion could not be controlled. However, this is not the case,
as emotional contagion is influenced by social context, for example, by
the relationship between observer and expresser (Hess and Fischer,
2013). Emotional contagion is stronger among relatives and familiar
others (Gonzalez-Liencres et al., 2014) and autonomic mimicry occurs
more often between members of the same species (humans-to-human
and chimpanzees-to-chimpanzee) (Kret et al., 2014). While emotional
contagion is fast, automatic and is shared by most vertebrates, cognitive
empathy has been related to primates and other intelligent animals
living in social groups such as dolphins, elephants, and wolves
(Sivaselvachandran et al., 2016). In humans, perspective taking does
not develop before the age of four, which suggests that empathy is not a
purely innate capacity, but that at least certain components develop
later in life and probably through learning from interactions with the
social environment (Adolphs, 2001; Selman, 1971; Walker, 1980).
Preston and de Waal (2002) posited that since emotional contagion
is an ontogenetically and phylogenetically older mental process, cog-
nitive empathy is likely to be an extension of emotional contagion or
even an identical process with added functions. In theory, the trajectory
of social cognitive development follows a progressive evolutionary/
developmental slope. In early childhood, the brain is still very malle-
able and relies heavily on external inputs. Social schemas and verbal
skills are yet to develop and the communication between the infant and
its caregiver is largely symbolic. Based on basic reflex-like mimicry, a
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child continuously learns new associations and an individual's social
abilities develop further. This is accompanied by the maturation of
prefrontal regions and increased neural density in the anterior cingulate
cortex (Gogtay et al., 2004). As the brain matures and becomes more
complex and stabilized, accumulated knowledge starts to serve as
predictors for further actions, which saves processing energy and the
need for vicarious learning. This is why in adulthood, mimicry may
become more cognitively redundant and play a rather affiliative func-
tion (e.g. serving more and more as a social function; Lakin and
Chartrand, 2003; Lakin et al., 2003). However, in infancy, mimicry
provides an implicit form of emotional communication and is a fun-
damental precursor for the development of higher cognitive abilities,
including empathy.
4. The empirical dispute
In recent years the scientific community began to question the role
of mimicry, shared neural activation and sensorimotor simulation (fa-
cial feedback) in facilitating empathy (Assogna et al., 2008; Hickok,
2009; Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005; Lamm and Majdandžić, 2015). These
critiques were not directed at the actual empirical foundations of mi-
micry per se. Instead, thus most mimicry and functional magnetic re-
sonance imaging (fMRI) studies rely on correlations (e.g., comparing
mimicry levels with empathy measures from questionnaires/tasks or
with neural activation), thus, determining the conceptual significance
of mimicry is extremely difficult. In particular, on the one hand, it could
be argued that mimicry is a form of emotional contagion that allows the
sharing of affective states between species (Gallese and Goldman, 1998;
Hatfield et al., 1994). On the other hand, it could be counter-argued
that cognitive empathy precedes mimicry. In other words, people first
psychologically appraise the social context before they “decide” to
empathize and display mimicry. From this standpoint, mimicry could
be seen as an epiphenomenon (e.g., of trust) that does not have a direct
impact on the development of empathy.
To determine a causal link between mimicry and empathy, earlier
research has tried to manipulate mimicry in humans and by studying
mimicry in clinical populations. For instance, Neal and Chartrand
(2011) tested participants’ performance on the “Reading the Mind in
the Eyes Test” (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) before and after Botox
treatment. In line with emotion contagion theories, this study revealed
that Botox administration blocked automatic facial mimicry and im-
paired subjects’ ability to recognize other peoples’ emotions. A classical
study by Strack et al. (1988) supports the facial feedback hypothesis by
showing that peoples’ facial activity influenced their emotional re-
sponses. Another study by Niedenthal et al. (2001) found that blocking
facial mimicry influenced participants’ emotional state and decreased
their ability to recognize emotional expressions. Similarly, in Oberman
et al.’s (2007) study, blocking facial muscle mimicry by biting on a pen
or chewing gum selectively impaired recognition of emotional expres-
sions, partially supporting the facial feedback theory stating that facial
mimicry enhances emotion recognition. Goldman and Sripada (2005)
reported studies showing that deficits in face-based recognition are
coupled with problems to produce the same emotions (fear, disgust, and
anger). However, research in clinical populations with impaired facial
feedback yield contradictory findings. Specifically, Bogart’s and
Matsumoto’s (2010) study revealed that subjects with Möbius syndrome
(facial paralysis) did not significantly differ from the control group in
emotion recognition, contradicting the view that facial mimicry is ne-
cessary for emotion recognition. Furthermore, research into Parkinson's
disease and emotion recognition has yielded mixed reports (see Assogna
et al., 2008, for review). Of course, it can be argued that clinical po-
pulations have developed compensatory mechanisms to recognize
emotional expressions in other people (Goldman and Sripada, 2005).
The great variety of methods and population samples used in mimicry
research makes it impossible to conduct a solid meta-analysis.
In summary, although mimicry research has been very informative,
a careful test for a causal relationship between mimicry and emotion
recognition is far from established and is an important issue to be ad-
dressed in future research. Despite a growing body of literature, the
empirical support for the role of mimicry in emotion processing has
remained controversial (Assogna and Pontieri, 2008; Bogart and
Matsumoto, 2010; Wagenmakers et al., 2016). We propose that is partly
because the underlying mechanisms of emotional contagion remain
largely elusive and not very well integrated. While one line of research
describes the neural correlates of face perception (Haxby et al., 2002)
and empathy (Carr et al., 2003; Decety et al., 2016; Decety and Lamm,
2007; Decety, 2011; Fan et al., 2011; Mutschler et al., 2013; Singer and
Lamm, 2009; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011),
others have described the non-verbal emotional signals that humans
share and mimic (Chartrand and Dalton, 2009; Chartrand and van
Baaren, 2009; Chartrand and Lakin, 2013; Kret, 2015). Moreover, very
few studies have directly investigated the neural correlates of mimicry
(Lee et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2006). Thus far, no model has de-
scribed a full cycle of emotional contagion. That is, no model has laid
out how information passes from a sender's face or body to a receiver's
brain and then to their face or body, and how the transition of per-
ceptual inputs builds emotional understanding. The present review
aims to provide such a conceptual model. In the Neurocognitive Model
of Emotional Contagion (NMEC), we explain how empathic abilities
emerge from a dynamic synchronous activity between two interacting
brains. We argue that while shared neural activation and automatic
mimicry reflect the degree to which people internally simulate per-
ceived emotional states, importantly, it is the emotional signals – not
the mimicry – that drive the common patterns of neural representations
that underlie empathy. To provide an in-depth understanding of the
behavioral mechanisms involved in emotional communication, in the
next section, we propose different levels of mimicry in humans and
explain how they may relate to the development of empathy.
5. Different levels of emotional contagion in humans
Kret’s (2015) schematic representation of emotion processing, see
Fig. 2, shows that emotions are expressed and experienced within three
main communication compartments, namely, psychological (Feelings/
Emotions), physiological (Arousal) and behavioral (Expressions). For
example, during a social interaction, both person A and person B ex-
perience feelings and emotions and these emotions are expressed
through physiological reactions and facial expressions. Consequently,
emotional contagion is likely to take place through all of these three
channels, although they are not always required simultaneously. In the
next section, we will use this schematic model to discuss various types
of automatic mimicry in infants and discuss their impact on affective
and cognitive development. A distinction in automatic mimicry will be
made between motor mimicry controlled by facial muscles which are
partly implicit, but can also be consciously controlled, and autonomic
mimicry which relies on an unconscious signaling system that is con-
trolled by the ANS. In the next section (5.1), we will primarily focus on
autonomic mimicry, which is an underexplored area in the emotional
contagion literature. In addition, we will also review several studies on
motor mimicry.
5.1. Motor mimicry
5.1.1. Facial muscle mimicry
One physical characteristic that distinguishes humans from any
other species, is the high level of expressiveness of the human face.
Humans’ closest relatives in the animal kingdom, namely chimpanzees,
have strikingly similar underlying mimetic musculature in their faces
(Parr and Waller, 2006). Still, humans have slightly more refined
muscles, especially around the eyes, and also smoother skin, readily
revealing muscle movement. Moreover, humans use a greater variety of
facial expressions and also detect facial movements with more speed
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and precision (Vick et al., 2007). The emotions people experience are
often automatically displayed in facial expressions without conscious
awareness or voluntary intention. Infants generate, attend to and mimic
facial expressions soon after birth (see Simpson et al., 2014, for a re-
view). Several studies have demonstrated that when a researcher shows
an infant a facial expression or gesture, such as the wiggling of a
tongue, the infant repeats the gesture by wiggling its tongue back
(Anisfeld, 1996; Field et al., 1982; Jones, 2006). This evidence has
fostered the theory that the innate tendency to imitate precedes emo-
tional understanding and empathy development in humans (de Waal
and Ferrari, 2010; Meltzoff and Decety, 2003a). A landmark study by
Meltzoff and Moore (1983) provided evidence that very young infants
ranging between 1 h and 3 days old, already imitated the behavior of
strangers. Psychophysiological research has found that facial mimicry is
at times almost instantaneous as people seem to be able to track the
most subtle moment-to-moment changes in their partners’ faces
(Dimberg et al., 2000). These micro-expressions are so subtle that they
sometimes cannot be detected by the human eye and can only be
measured through electromyography (EMG), i.e., with electrodes that
are sensitive to micro-movements of the facial muscles (Dimberg and
Thunberg, 1998; Tamietto et al., 2009). In line with the facial feedback
theory, some evidence suggests that people do indeed recognize emo-
tions from other peoples’ faces by experiencing changes in their own
physiological state. In the Ekman et al. (1983) study, participants were
asked to produce the following six basic emotions; disgust, surprise,
anger, fear, sadness and happiness. They were requested to either recall
times when they experienced such emotions, or to arrange their facial
muscles according to these emotions. This study revealed that both the
act of recalling emotional experiences and the production of facial ex-
pressions produced the same skin conductance response. This finding
suggests that facial expressions can generate ANS responses informing
an observer about the partner's emotional experience. In another study,
Dimberg et al. (2000) tested the implicit activity of facial muscles in-
volved in smiling and frowning in response to emotional pictures of
faces. They predicted that if distinct emotions can be automatically
elicited by subliminal cues, then the unconscious exposure to happy or
sad faces should differentially activate these muscles. In line with this
hypothesis, the results revealed that participants’ muscle responses
were implicitly elicited and corresponded to the muscle movements
that were generated during happy and sad facial expressions, even
though participants reported not being aware of the stimuli presenta-
tion, nor of their own muscle movements. Similarly, Tamietto et al.
(2009) found that facial and bodily expressions trigger fast emotionally
congruent facial expressions in observers. Interestingly, this effect was
enhanced when affective stimuli were presented subliminally.
Niedenthal et al. (2012) showed that a pacifier disrupted facial mimicry
in male children and was associated with compromised emotional de-
velopment (lower perspective taking and emotional intelligence). The
pacifier use did not predict these emotion processing skills in girls.
The above-reviewed findings suggest that people (a) are generally
not consciously aware of subtle changes in a partner's facial char-
acteristics and (b) do not voluntarily react to them, but still process
these subtle signals as is demonstrated by mimicry. By doing so, they
process information about a partner's emotional expressions via their
own physiological feedback. Oostenbroek et al.’s (2016) recent long-
itudinal study of 106 infants between the ages of one and nine weeks,
failed to replicate evidence for infants’ imitation of any of the 9 ob-
served gestures previously reported in the literature. With regards to
this replication failure, the authors challenged the view that imitation is
an innate capacity. However, as mentioned earlier, facial mimicry is
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of emotion processing during social interactions, adapted from Fig. 1, Kret (2015) shows how emotions that are expressed during a social interaction by
Person A, through emotional contagion, influence the emotions and expressions of Person B. Person A and B not only mimic each other's facial expression, they also link on the
physiological level and without being aware of it, synchronize on the level of arousal.
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only one type of mimicry. Motor mimicry can be implicit and without
awareness, but can also be consciously inhibited and controlled, to
some extent. We refer to these types of mimicries as motor mimicry, as
muscle movements are involved which rely on the activation of motor
preparation areas. In the following section, we will review some other
types of motor mimicry (eye-contact and contagious crying) in order to
give examples of how motor muscles may have an impact on affective
behavior and mental health later in life. We will then review research
showing that in addition to motor movements, infants mimic the pupil
sizes of observed others (Fawcett et al., 2016), cardiovascular responses
(Feldman et al., 2011; Moore et al., 2007) and hormonal levels (Laurent
et al., 2012). The broad variety of the different types of mimicry
documented in the literature suggests that social information can be
shared on many more levels than previously thought.
5.1.2. Eye contact
One of the earliest and most salient types of automatic mimicry is
dyadic joint attention, or mutual eye-gaze. In our view, eye contact
classifies as mimicry simply because in order to make eye contact, two
people must be able to synchronize their eye movements. Research
shows that direct eye contact is related to other forms of mimicries
(e.g., Feldman, 2012; Wang et al., 2011) and it's abnormalities has been
linked to problems with empathy (Charman et al., 1997) and autism
(Senju and Johnson, 2009). During close interactions, both infants and
adults focus on their interactive partner's eyes, grasp emotion signals
from the eye whites and pupils and also follow eye gazes (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1995; Kret and de Dreu, 2017; Haith et al., 1977). Research
shows that the direct eye region captures more attention than an
averted gaze (Farroni et al., 2002). By following gazes, people can
follow the path of a partner's attention, get insight into his/her emo-
tions and also share experiences (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995). Research
has reported that direct eye contact increases autonomic mimicry in
heart beat between a mother and a child (Feldman et al., 2011). Wang
et al. (2011) found that direct eye gaze increases the speed of mi-
micking hand movements by 13 ms compared to an averted gaze. The
authors proposed that this is possibly because direct eye gaze relies on
an innate biological system that inevitably stimulates arousal levels in
the observer, which in turn leads to faster processing of the social si-
tuation and fosters social understanding. Whether eye contact can be
accounted for a type of mimicry might be disputable, nevertheless, the
fact that eye contact is a contagious communicative signal that transfers
affective information is undeniable. With the muscles attached to their
eyeballs. Conceptually, we do not see any reason why certain muscles
should be excluded from mimicry. Furthermore, similar to facial mi-
micry, eye contact is an innate reflexive human predisposition that is
not always under our conscious control, which makes it a likely source
of emotional contagion (Kret, 2015). Consistent with this, longer eye
contact is positively correlated with trust, sexual attraction and open-
ness, but also with aggression and fear (Kleinke, 1986). In light of this
evidence, we conclude that eye contact is of the utmost importance and
fosters emotional contagion.
5.1.3. Contagious crying
Most people who have visited a new-born ward will have noticed
that crying is contagious. Martin and Clark (1982) played audio re-
cordings to new-borns. They found that one-day-old babies were more
likely to mimic crying when they heard a recording of another newborn
crying, than when they heard their own cries, or heard a much older
infant crying. The specificity of mimicking supports the view that
crying mimicry is not merely the result of elevated noise but is a con-
tagion mechanism. Geangu et al. (2010) tested infants at 1, 3, 6, and 9
months of age in response to different types of cries. Their emotional
reactions were recorded in terms of vocal (presence of vocal distress,
latency and intensity) and facial expressions (anger and sadness). The
results revealed that infants from all age categories mimicked crying,
whereby the distress was highest in response to cries of pain. The ability
to distinguish between different types of crying that is accompanied by
the similar response of distress has been claimed to be one of the first
signs of empathy in humans.
In the previous section, we reviewed different levels of emotional
contagion in humans. Kret’s (2015) schematic representation of emo-
tion processing during social interactions shows that mimicry is very
broad and complex. People mimic not only motor expressions, but also
autonomic signals, which is still an underexplored area in current
emotion research. In the next section we will review such evidence
demonstrating that apart from facial expressions, direct eye contact and
contagious crying, adults and young infants also tend to mimic auto-
nomic responses which rely on an unconscious signaling system that is
controlled by the ANS. Importantly, these autonomic signals are harder
to control than facial muscles and they add to the perceived intensity of




Mothers and their children share a deep physiological connection.
This type of physiological linkage is shared by most mammals and re-
presents the earliest form of emotional contagion that occurs between a
mother and a child already before birth (Feldman, 2012). In 2010, a
team of doctors at Sydney hospital witnessed nothing less than the
miraculous power of this strong physiological connection. Kate Ogg has
put her prematurely-born son on her chest, whispering words of com-
fort in soothing words. Doctors told her that he would die soon, and she
was prepared to say her last goodbye. Then something unexpected
happened, little Jamie moved. She cried for help, but doctors refused to
come back, believing it was only a reflex; they didn’t want to keep Kate
in denial. After two hours of skin-to-skin contact, Jamie opened his
eyes. Jamie is a healthy young boy today, he lives with his family and
twin sister in Sydney (Crane, 2015).
The current literature agrees that what saved little Jamie’s life was a
physiological synchrony between him and his mother (Feldman et al.,
2014). Accumulating evidence reports that skin-to-skin contact be-
tween mother and infant can significantly reduce neonatal mortality
(Feldman et al., 2014; Lawn et al., 2010). Researchers attest that this is
because when infants are put into direct contact with the skin of their
mothers, this has a positive impact on child’s physiological adaptation
and behavior (for a systematic review and meta-analysis see, Moore
et al., 2007). Research shows that the mammalian’s ANS controls heart
beat and develops through tactile, thermal and nutritive stimuli pro-
vided by the mother’s body (Hofer, 1987). Mother-infant synchrony in
autonomic physiology is a well-documented phenomenon (for a sys-
tematic review, Palumbo et al., 2016). In psychology, this is also called
“autonomic mimicry”, “physiological linkage” or “physiological syn-
chrony” and refers to any associative pattern in the physiologies of
interacting partners. Because infants breathe irregularly and have a
faster heart rate than adults, by feeling their mothers’ heart palpations
and breathing movements, they automatically mimic their mother’s
cardiovascular responses and temperature and more quickly reach
homeostasis (Gray et al., 2000; Moore et al., 2007). The skin-to-skin
contact early after birth is associated with reduced stress, an enhanced
mother-infant bond and cognitive development 25 years later (Charpak
et al., 2005).
Interestingly, autonomic mimicry can also occur without any direct
physical contact (Levenson and Gottman, 1983; Palumbo et al., 2016).
This is a striking observation considering that physiological states are
uncontrollable and except for the pupil size, are invisible to an inter-
action partner. For instance, research suggests that during non-physical
close interactions, mothers and infants synchronize their heart rhythms
and breathing patterns (Feldman, 2011; Palumbo et al., 2016). Inter-
estingly, the heart rate synchrony significantly increases when the
mother and child mimic each other's smiles and show vocal mimicry,
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which suggests its link to affective communication. Although mother-
infant ANS synchrony is generally a positive marker, the physiological
linkage can also have a negative impact. Animal studies, mainly in
rodents, have revealed that early maternal contact is related to phy-
siological and behavioral processes that have an impact on the infant's
brain system development. These regulatory systems are essential for
support of cognitive and social skills that manage stress and guide or-
ganisms in its environment (Hofer, 1987; Meaney, 2001). For example,
numerous studies have reported that maternal stress negatively impacts
on the development of an infant’s Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal
(HPA) axis and mental health (Van den Bergh et al., 2008; Weinstock,
2005).
Dysfunction of the HPA axis is expressed by elevated cortisol levels
andis related to increased vulnerability to stress and depression (Shea
et al., 2005; Heim et al., 2008). Field et al. (1989) tested the coherence
and cross coherence in heart rate and behavioral states in mother–-
infant dyads with depressed and non-depressed mothers while dyads
were interacting face-to-face. The results showed that there was a
synchrony in heart rate for both depressed and non-depressed dyads,
showing no difference in autonomic mimicry between depressed and
non-depressed dyads. A recent longitudinal study by Van Puyvelde
et al. (2015) assessed respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) – synchrony of
breathing rate and heart rate (a physiological marker of para-
sympathetic response). In this experiment, mothers breathed at varying
paces while holding their infants. The testing was repeated every week
for an eight-week-long period and then again in the twelfth week. This
study showed that mother-infant dyads’ RSA synchronized across dif-
ferent breathing paces. The autonomic synchrony was observed until
infants were 8 weeks old, but dyads no longer synchronize at week 12.
A link between autonomic mimicry and parenting behavior was found
in Creaven’s and colleagues’ (2014) experiment examining the effect of
child maltreatment on heart rate and RSA synchrony in 104 mother-
child dyads. The mother and child (3–5 years old) pairs were resting
quietly in near proximity while watching an animated (low-action)
video. A significant positive correspondence was found in the heart
rates of non-maltreating mother-child groups, while negative heart rate
synchrony was found between mothers and children in the maltreating
groups. The RSA synchrony was negatively correlated in both groups.
Apart from heart rate and RSA, a recent study reported triadic auto-
nomic mimicry between 103 adolescents and their parents during a
family conflict discussion task (Saxbe et al., 2014). Researchers sampled
saliva before and after a conflict. During this laboratory study, fathers’,
mothers’, and adolescents’ cortisol levels were positively correlated.
Results showed that the mothers’ cortisol level was predicted by that of
the adolescents’, the fathers’ cortisol level was predicted by that of the
mothers’, and adolescents’ cortisol level was predicted by that of the
fathers’. The authors concluded that during family interactions, mem-
bers displayed shared physiological reactions which reflect family dy-
namics. Papp et al. (2009) examined parent-adolescent cortisol syn-
chrony in 45 families. Results indicated a significant covariation over
time in mother-adolescent cortisol levels. In addition, mother-adoles-
cent cortisol synchrony was strengthened among dyads in which mo-
thers and adolescents spent more time together, and in families with
high parent-adolescent shared activities and high parental supervision.
The here reviewed evidence shows that the physiological state of a
mother can directly affect the physiological profile of a child, which is
also translated in the psycho-emotional interaction between the pair.
However, this physiological linkage is only beneficial if the mother is
psychologically healthy and has a normal HPA activity and if the infant
is normally attached to her (Van den Bergh et al., 2008; Weinstock,
2005). Only recently have researchers started to argue for a broader
exploration of emotional signals from other autonomic sources. Speci-
fically, the synchronization of pupil-diameter, blood profusion of the
skin (i.e. redness) and temperature have all been proposed as potential
autonomic pathways to emotional contagion (Kret, 2015). These signals
are directly related to changes in the ANS and therefore are much
harder to control than facial muscles. Yet, because at least some of these
signals (for example pupillary changes) are principally visible to ob-
servers, they might add to the perceived intensity of facial expressions
or even overrule the emotional signals that facial muscles try to com-
municate. For instance, a smile combined with red cheeks may be in-
terpreted differently than a smile on a very pale face.
5.2.2. Pupil mimicry
Changes in pupil diameter are related to ANS activity (Partala and
Surakka, 2003). While pupil dilation is a physiological marker of the
sympathetic ‘flight-or-fight response’, the constriction of pupils is part
of the parasympathetic ‘rest and digest response’. What makes pupils
especially interesting is that in contrast to most other physiological
expressions of autonomic arousal such as GSRs (Galvanic Skin Re-
sponses), cardiovascular changes and neural activity, pupil-size changes
are, consciously or unconsciously, in principal visible to others. Hess
et al. (1965) presented heterosexual and homosexual groups pictures of
males and females. They showed that heterosexual males showed a
greater pupil response when looking at pictures of women than when
looking at pictures of men. For the homosexual group, it was the other
way around. Hess (1975) was the first to argue that in addition to
adaptations to changes in light in the environment, pupils may also
fulfill a social function as they constitute an implicit form of commu-
nication between people. In one of the first experiments on the topic,
Hess (1975) presented participants with pairs of pictures of the same
young woman; the pictures were completely identical except for one
small difference: in one of these pictures the woman had relatively large
pupils, while in the other one her pupils were made relatively small.
Participants, unaware of this manipulation, perceived the woman with
large pupils as friendlier, softer and warmer than the woman with the
small pupils. This evidence was the first to show that another’s pupil
size is processed and implicitly picked up by observers. Kret (2015)
argues that this positive association is formed through pupil-mimicry,
also dubbed ‘pupillary contagion’ (Harrison et al., 2007; Fawcett et al.,
2016). Pupil mimicry is not uniquely human and has been observed in
chimpanzees as well (Kret et al., 2014). In their study, which included
both humans and chimpanzees, Kret and her colleagues found that
pupil sizes synchronized between partners of the same species during
social interactions, but not during cross-species interactions. In a
second human study, a link with behavior was observed: when parti-
cipants synchronized their pupil size with the dilating pupils of their
virtual partner, they established greater trust in their partner (Kret
et al., 2015). Intriguingly, this only worked for interactions with part-
ners from the same ethnic group. These findings have recently been
replicated in a study (Kret and de Dreu, 2017). Another recent study
revealed that also 6 and 9-month-olds infants show pupil mimicry
(Fawcett et al., 2016). This evidence suggests that pupil mimicry is
inborn or develops early in infancy, which is supportive of the view that
pupil-mimicry might be an early contagious mechanism that constitutes
affective transfer between individuals and in this way contributes to
social behavior.
5.2.3. Blushing
Another form of autonomic mimicry may be found in blushing; al-
though this has not been investigated substantially. What is known
about blushing is that when people experience a strong affect, their skin
gets perfused with oxygenated blood (Drummond and Lazaroo, 2012).
Such a change is directly observable by increased redness of the face.
People associate redness in the face with health, anger or aggression;
however, blushing may also signal shyness or embarrassment
(Dijket al., 2009; Dijk et al., 2011; Shearn et al., 1990). It is possible
that blushing has evolved as a passive behavioral defense, confirming a
lower status in the social hierarchy. Redness of the face has been shown
to affect observers’ social judgments. For example, Dijk et al. (2011)
found that higher levels of redness are associated with greater trust. In
this experiment, subjects played a prisoner’s dilemma game on a
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computer screen with a photograph of an opponent who defected
subjects during the game. A photograph of the opponent displayed ei-
ther a blushing face or a face with a neutral color. The follow-up trust
task showed that blushing opponents were trusted more as they were
expected not to defect again. Another recent study by Drummond and
Bailey (2013) demonstrated that direct eye contact evokes blushing
independently of a participant’s subjective negative affect. This finding
implies that blushing is not necessarily related to conscious feelings of
social awareness, but can be an unconscious bottom-up physiological
response to nonverbal social cues. Even though no direct evidence
presently exists for ‘blushing mimicry’, the literature reviewed here
demonstrates that like pupil size, blushing is an autonomic response
that is difficult to control, and therefore may be another contagious
mechanism that plays a social signaling role, providing an implicit form
of communication between individuals.
In the previous section we have reviewed evidence showing that at
the beginning of life, people align their physiology with their care-
givers; this, in turn, has an impact on their social behavior. The auto-
nomic mimicry between the infant’s and mother’s moment-by-moment
physiologic states suggests that infants possess a finely tuned system
that is sensitive to its caregivers’ autonomic cues (Feldman et al., 2014).
Furthermore, the here reviewed evidence supports the view that emo-
tional contagion and social bonds operate both on the physiological and
cognitive level. The fact that emotional contagion between a mother
and a child can have both a positive or a negative impact on a child’s
socio-emotional development. And also that mimicry occurs at different
levels of processing (behavioral/autonomic), complements this work’s
view that empathic abilities emerge from the physical-cognitive inter-
action during a child’s development with its social surrounding. In the
next section, we will explain how emotional contagion may work on a
neurocognitive level.
6. The correspondence problem
Mimicry requires the mimicker to solve the correspondence pro-
blem; the ability to translate visual information from an observed action
into matching motor output (Heyes, 2005). For more than three dec-
ades this has been a widely debated problem in developmental psy-
chology and neuroscience. Meltzoff and Moore (1997) put forward an
active intermodal matching model (AIM), arguing that the
correspondence problem is solved by an innate cognitive mechanism or
‘body scheme’ that computes and detects similarities between observed
and executed acts. Infants’ own facial expressions are not directly
visible to themselves, but they are still perceived/felt by them. For in-
stance, when infants see facial movements, these movements are
mapped onto the infant's own facial movements. This transition is re-
flected in mimicry. Meltzoff (2002) proposed that infants’ imitation
implicates ‘an innate common code of human acts’ or ‘supramodal’
representation that provides transformations of acts between the self
and the other. In later work, Meltzoff and Decety (2003b) linked the
neural basis for common coding to areas known to be involved in the
mirror neuron system (premotor cortex and the superior and inferior
parietal cortices, in particular, the right inferior parietal cortex is in-
volved specifically in the intention to imitate). Some believe that in-
fants begin to understand others’ actions through a direct link between
action observation and execution supported by the mirror neuron
system (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). Nevertheless, further specifica-
tions of the code that would explain how understanding is formed
through action observation are still under empirical debate. Rizzolatti
and Craighero (2004, p.172) proposed that “Each time an individual sees
an action done by another individual, neurons that represent that action are
activated in the observer's premotor cortex. This automatically induced
motor representation of the observed action corresponds to that which is
spontaneously generated during the active action and whose outcome is
known to the acting individual. Thus, the mirror system transforms visual
information into knowledge”. The central idea is that observing the same
movement in others enables self-generated movements which induce
inherent meaning of the observed action. From a developmental per-
spective, the AIM model suggests that a newborn infant receives in-
formation about others intentions based on sensorimotor resonance
from its own motor neurons and muscle movements. The problem is
that such a theory only works when one sensory input is associated with
one cause (Hickok, 2009; Kilner et al., 2007). In real life, the same
sensory input can have many causes. For example, one may cover one's
eyes to protect them from the burning sun or hide them in embar-
rassment. Thus, an identical movement may have several causes and
goals in executors and multiple possible interpretations in observers.
In contrast to the AIM view, more recent findings from cognitive
neuroscience, artificial intelligence and the evolution of cognition are
suggestive of an alternative argument- ‘a wealth of the stimulus
Fig. 3. Neurological Mechanisms of Autonomic Mimicry. Sender: (1) Sender's stress response is initiated by hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis activation. (2) Adrenal gland secretes
ACTH increasing the level of CRH in the bloodstream. (3) The neuroendocronological reactions are accompanied by cardiovascular changes, muscle tension, pupil dilation, blushing, and
sweating. Receiver: (4) The affective information is implicitly registered by receivers’ senses and passes through (5) the CS-Pulv pathway to the AMG. (6) The AMG and LC activate the
HPA. (7) AMG and LC project to higher cortical networks such as OFC, ACC and VMPFC influencing social decisions. (8) Sender and receiver emotionally converge on physiological (gray)
and cognitive (white) levels.
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argument’ (Ray and Heyes, 2011). The ‘wealth of the stimulus’ argu-
ment suggests that the reciprocity between human social behaviors
provides sufficient information to power-associative learning and on-
togenetically develop the capacity to imitate (Smith et al., 1999;
Thelen, 2001). In contrast to the AIM model, Associative sequence
learning (ASL) by Ray and Heyes (2011) proposes that infants can learn
flexibly from their own environment and therefore are not dependent
on a specialized ‘innate cognitive mechanism’. The principle of asso-
ciative learning is that in order to be able to mimic a perceived action,
an infant first needs to see the action and perform the contingent action
contingently (close together in time). Indeed, observational studies in
young children show that infants spend a large amount of time looking
at their limbs and explore sensorimotor changes produced by their
movements (Rochat, 1998). But even more crucially, the experience of
being imitated is fundamental for the development of imitation in hu-
mans (Ray and Heyes, 2011). Research shows that infants spend most of
their waking time interacting face-to-face with their caregiver, from
which 65% of this time the adult expresses salient emotions and they
engage in imitation episodes (Uzgiris et al., 1989). Imitation occurs
very frequently; approximately once a minute in mother-infant face-to-
face interactions and most times the mother is imitating the child
(Pawlby, 1977). Hickok (2009) argues that perhaps just like un-
conscious reflexes, mirror neurons do not code for any particular
meaning or goal-directed action. Instead, similarly to Pavlovian asso-
ciations, the activity of mirror neurons simply reflects on associative
learning via sensory–motor pairings. In support of this theory, evidence
shows that mirror system activation can be recoded with training such
that it becomes associated with a completely different action (Catmur
et al., 2007). In summary, while the AIM model assumes an innate
mechanism, which automatically converts the sensory signals related to
the mother's behavioral states to the corresponding motor states of the
receiver, without any prior experience (or training), the ASL model
assumes extensive learning (or conditioning) experience.
Building upon previous influential neuroscientific reviews (Decety,
2010; Kret, 2015; Schuler et al., 2016; Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010),
we here introduce a new Neurocognitive Model of Emotional Contagion
(NMEC). In contrast to a detailed list of all neural substrates involved in
each component of empathy that can be found in previous literature
(Carr et al., 2003; Decety, 2011; Nummenmaa et al., 2008; Shamay-
Tsoory, 2011), the NMEC describes how social signals dynamically pass
from senders’ facial displays to receivers’ brains and bodies, and how
the transition of perceptual inputs builds emotional understanding. In
particular, we propose that the understanding of actions and emotions
may rely on more general perception–action matching mechanisms.
The NMEC shows that measurements of several types of mimicry at
once will provide a more holistic physiological profile of the level to
which people understand/processes other people's social signals. This
conceptual framework has practical implications for further clinical and
developmental research (Kret and Ploeger, 2015). The concrete map-
ping of its mechanisms should be an important aim for future research.
7. The neurocognitive model of emotional contagion (NMEC)
The core assumption of the perception action model of empathy
proposed by Preston and de Waal (2002) is that perceiving a target’s
state automatically activates the corresponding representations of that
state in the observer, which in turn activates somatic and autonomic
responses. In line with the perception–action mechanism, a number of
behavioral studies using EMG, demonstrated that viewing facial ex-
pressions triggers similar expressions on the observer’s own face
(Dimberg et al., 2000; Tamietto and Castelli, 2009; Kret et al., 2013a,b).
This observation has been related to the discovery of the Mirror-neu-
rons system (MNS) in the premotor area, F5, of the macaque monkey
which discharges not only during action execution but also during ac-
tion observation (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992). Further fMRI studies in
humans have shown that the perception of a specific emotion activates
similar neural systems in the observer that are responsible for the
generation of that emotion. For instance, a similar neural response has
been found following the perception of other’s and own experience of
pain (Jackson et al., 2006b), fear (de Gelder et al., 2004; Hadjikhani
and de Gelder, 2003), disgust (Wicker et al., 2003), anxiety (Prehn-
Kristensen et al., 2009), reward (Mobbs et al., 2009) and also higher
order affects such as envy (Takahashi et al., 2009) and embarrassment
(Krach et al., 2011). In 2011, Anders, Heinzle, Weiskopf, Ethofer, and
Haynes used information-based fMRI to investigate the flow of affective
information between two interactive brains of romantic partners. In this
experiment, both partners were engaged in on-going face-to-face com-
munication whilst inside the scanner. The sender (either male or fe-
male) was instructed to pose different emotional expressions to share
his or her feelings with his or her partner (the receiver), while the
Fig. 4. Motor mimicry (1) Observation of bodily movements activates the STS which is involved in early visual description of actions. (2) The STS projects to the IPL with mirror neurons
tracking precise kinaesthetic movements and (3) passes this information to the IFG coding for ‘the goal of the action’. (4) The goal directed motor plans are sent from the IFG via the IPL
back to the STS. (5) The MNS coupling initiates motor mimicry. The anterior insula AI (green) connects MNS with AMG and provides a possible neurological crossroad between these two
independent, yet mutually interacting systems. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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partner was trying to understand the affective experience of the sender.
Apart from cerebral blood flow, skin conductance responses (SCR) were
also measured to assess the partners’ physiological arousal during each
interaction period. The neuroimaging results revealed that the level of
neural activity within the emotion-specific network predicted the
neural activity in the same network in the perceiver's brain and the
neural coupling was associated with synchrony of the autonomic
system. Importantly, this was achieved with the same temporal re-
solution corresponding to the phase of partners’ affective interactions.
These findings are fundamental in the way they show that during face-
to-face interactions, the movements in the partner’s face are directly
projected and can be decoded from the observer’s neural activation.
Scientists referred to this as ‘neural resonance’ or ‘shared neural acti-
vation’ and have documented this as a robust and consistent phenom-
enon in emotion perception studies. In modern neuroscience, this ob-
servation has transformed the way we think about neural architecture
as it suggests that affective perception and its expression are not se-
parate neurocognitive entities. These accounts provide empirical sup-
port for the hypothesis that neural resonance and automatic mimicry
are directly involved in emotional contagion and empathy (Hatfield
et al., 1994; Preston and de Waal, 2002).
In addition to this view, we propose that while mirror neuron ac-
tivation and mimicry reflect on the degree to which people internally
simulate perceived emotions, it is the perceptual input, not the neural/
physiological resonance per se, that drives emotional contagion be-
tween species. Hasson et al. (2012) proposed that environmental sti-
muli, including faces, emit different forms of mechanical, chemical and
electromagnetic energy. The sensory receptors convert these elements
into electrical impulses that the brain then uses to gather environmental
information and to coordinate an appropriate action. In this way, via
the transmission of a signal through the environment, the neural pro-
cesses in one brain can couple to the neural processes in another
(Hasson et al., 2004; Stephens et al., 2010). To the best of our knowl-
edge, at the time of writing this review, no neurocognitive model has
incorporated different emotional signals into one neurocognitive fra-
mework. The present review therefore illustrates how affective in-
formation passes from one person's facial display to another's body and
brain, and how the transition of perceptual input improves emotional
understanding. The NMEC (Figs. 3 and 4) depicts a situation where a
sender is experiencing a sudden feeling of anxiety while being observed
by a receiver.
Imaging research has demonstrated that the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the tempor-
oparietal junction (TPJ) play roles in perspective taking, self-awareness,
and in more cognitive types of empathy (Carr et al., 2003; Decety and
Lamm, 2007; Nummenmaa et al., 2008). The subcortical areas pro-
cessing, among other things, emotions, and the regions that are known
to be part of the MNS such as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, Brodmann
area 44), are associated with more basic emotional contagion/emo-
tional empathy (Carr et al., 2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, and
Perry, 2009). In the NMEC, we focus on these emotional contagion
areas, which develop from early infancy onward.
7.1. NMEC: the autonomic mimicry pathway (Fig. 3)
One conceptual difficulty with mimicry is that it is hard to differ-
entiate it from a response. For example, if one expresses fear following
another's outburst of anger, this is an emotional reaction. But what if
the result is an expression of anger? Is this still a reaction or should this
be defined as mimicry? In our theoretical framework, we would like to
conceptualize any type of interaction that results in corresponding au-
tonomic levels between sender and receiver as autonomic mimicry.
Accordingly, in the NMEC we argue that autonomic mimicry relies
largely on the same neural substrates and pathways that are also in-
volved in emotion responses and ANS activation. Aversive responses,
including feelings of fear or anxiety, are modulated by hardwired
neural circuits that share common neuroarchitectures among mammals
(Le Doux, 2012; Parr and Waller, 2006). These basic evaluative systems
are associated with the ANS and motor responses that together aid the
adaptive responding of the organism (Decety, 2011). The feeling of fear
is related to the activation of the sympathetic nervous system (Armony
and Le Doux, 1997). Sympathetic nerves are located near the brainstem
and the stress response is initiated by activation of the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (Herman et al., 2005). When the HPA axis
is activated, the adrenal medulla secretes acetylcholine increasing
(adrenaline) epinephrine and (noradrenaline) norepinephrine release.
This, in turn, activates the cardio- vascular system and, as a result, heart
and respiration rates increase and digestion slows down (Herman et al.,
2005). Importantly, sympathetic nerves are directly connected to sen-
sory channels on the surface of the body, such as the pupils, the skin
and the muscles (Ekman et al., 1983). For this reason, arousal can lead
to autonomic pupil dilation, blushing, skin conductance, as well as in-
voluntary facial/bodily expressions (see Fig. 3, Sender).
In nature, organisms survive and thrive by detecting unconditioned
arousal signals. In the case of both olfactory and visual unconditioned
signals (such as a partner's pupil size), the signals are generally pro-
cessed implicitly, passing through the superior colliculus (CS)- pulvinar
(Pulv) pathway to the amygdala (AMG; Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010).
The amygdala is a brain region located in the deep layers of the limbic
cortex and is mainly associated with detecting biologically relevant
cues including emotions expressed by peoples’ faces and bodies
(Adolphs, 2001; Atkinson and Adolphs, 2005). This area is also used to
direct the appropriate action following threat detection (Armony and Le
Doux, 1997) and is an important regulator of stress-related gluco-
corticoids in response to physical or psychological stressors (Dedovic
et al., 2009). Research shows that monkeys, similar to humans, exhibit
increased amygdala signaling in response to emotional faces (Gothard
et al., 2007). When a receiver perceives a signal of a partner's increased
arousal, the amygdala activates the locus coeruleus (LC) part of the
noradrenergic system (Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010). The locus
coeruleus has connections to the ventromedial hypothalamus, which in
turn, outputs to motor control areas to promote adaptive behavioral
responses to the event (Phillips and Le Doux, 1992). As a consequence,
in response to the mother's autonomic signals, the infant automatically
experiences a reflection of the mother's arousal in his or her own body
and thus, both synchronize their ANS responses (Fig. 3, Receiver).
Apart from the LC in the brain-stem, the AMG also projects to
temporal and frontal regions including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The amygdala and the OFC
share reciprocal connections with the superior temporal sulcus (STS)
that underlies rapid and prioritized processing of affective signals
(Decety, 2011). These areas are involved in emotional control and
higher forms of empathy such as perspective-taking (Adolphs, 2001;
Mutschler et al., 2013). These higher-order regions fully develop rela-
tively late in development (Gogtay et al., 2004). In early development,
subcortical circuits including the amygdala, hypothalamus, hippo-
campus and OFC, are essential components of affective arousal.
7.1.1. How are the autonomic states of a sender mapped onto the receiver?
The NMEC (Fig. 3) shows that autonomic responses of the sender
directly modulate neural activity in the emotion system of the receiver.
In line with the AIM, we argue that this form of emotional contagion is
fast, automatic, shared by most vertebrates and does not require ex-
tensive training. The mimicry of autonomic responses (such as pupil
size change, facial redness, cardiovascular responses and hormonal
level) detected by the receiver results in emotion system coupling be-
tween the infant and its caregiver. Human infants possess an innate
mechanism which automatically converts the sensory signals related to
senders’ autonomic states to their own corresponding autonomic states.
Yet, how are the autonomic states of a sender mapped onto the re-
ceiver?
Kilner et al’s. (2007) predictive coding framework of the mirror
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neuron system provides a promising account of its potential mechan-
isms. These predictive computations are not necessarily tied to one
specific neural system but can take place at different forms of functional
processing including the emotion system. Similar to PAM (Preston and
de Waal, 2002), in the predictive coding framework, perception and
action are tightly coupled (Barrett and Simmons, 2015). Through sen-
sorimotor feedback, an organism’s body receives essential information
from its environment. For example, the receptors in the skin inform us
about the angle of the surface we walk on, the temperature of the air
and the taste of food. These highly specialized innate mechanisms
transmit environmental stimuli to impulses in our brain, making us
move and act adaptively in our environment. Similarly, the autonomic
signals of an expresser, such as his or her pupil size, changes in facial
redness, cardiovascular responses and hormonal levels are implicitly
(unconditionally) detected by the receiver. As information arrives via
receptors of the body (visual, olfactory, auditory, tactile receptors,
among others), predictions are sent through the cortex. Limbic cortices,
with their simple laminar structure, issue predictions within every
sensory system with a well-developed laminar structure (Chanes and
Barrett, 2016). These predictions induce the discharge of neurons in
regions anticipating the trajectory of an emotional reaction, while re-
ceiving actual sensory input from the environment. Hence, predictions
function as hypotheses about the world that can be tested against
sensory signals that arrive in the brain (Barrett and Simmons, 2015). A
mismatch between sensory input and prediction is registered as a pre-
diction error. The brain tries to minimize ‘prediction error’ by reducing
such a mismatch. One way to do this is via mimicry. By generating a
response to mimic the observed sensory input, the prediction error is
sent back along cortical connections to update predictions about the
situation. A newly born’s brain has strongly developed limbic structures
but the neocortex is still underdeveloped. Since human behavior often
fails to follow an anticipated pattern of action, coupled withinfants’ lack
of prior experiences, the model of the world is still to be established.
During this process, autonomic mimicry can be beneficial to reduce
prediction errors and to establish emotion system coupling between the
infant and its caregiver. For a detailed description of computations, see
Kilner et al. (2007) and Chanes and Barrett (2016).
The fact that arousing stimuli and others’ reactions toward arousing
stimuli induce arousal in the observer has obvious evolutionary bene-
fits. However, it is important to note that we cannot just assume that
perceived autonomic states of the sender must only elicit corresponding
autonomic states because of the adaptive value. Just because default
responses are in place, it does not mean that they determine human
actions. Instead of the brain being a ‘stimulus–response’ organ stimu-
lated by a specific type of emotion (e.g. fear, happiness or anger), the
brain functions as a generative system which constructs others’ emo-
tions as affective information accumulates over time. While the visual
information (i.e. pupil size, facial redness) gives a description of the
visible affective components, it does not provide a full explanation
critical for understanding the other's emotional state in all its com-
plexity. For that conjunction, a variety of autonomic input is essential to
estimate the prior probability (from past experiences) to create the
posterior probabilities that serve as a prediction about the action.
Predictions guide our actions and perception by continually con-
structing possible representations relative to the present context. In
other words, the organism has the opportunity to choose from the re-
pertoire of actions based on past experience, yet does not require ex-
tensive training as innate “default processes” are already in place. This
gives organisms greater flexibility and avoids single input–output re-
lationship criticized in mirror neuron theories (Hickok, 2009; Kilner
et al., 2007).
Kleckner et al. (2017) argued that ascending sensory inputs from the
organs, such as autonomic visceral and vascular function, neuroendo-
crine fluctuations are similarly anticipated by the brain to anticipate
bodily needs before they even arise. In support of NMEC, researchers
began to identify analogous introspective mechanisms for representing
sensations from within the body (Kleckner et al., 2017). With the use of
tract-tracing experiments in macaque monkeys, followed by fMRI stu-
dies in humans, researchers were able to map the intrinsic allostatic/
interoceptive system supported by subcortical, hippocampal, brainstem
and cerebellar connectivity. In the follow-up fMRI experiment, subjects
viewed arousing photos. The results showed that individuals with
stronger functional connectivity within the allostatic/interoceptive
system also reported greater arousal while viewing images and also
demonstrated a greater sympathetic nervous system activity while
viewing arousing images. This evidence suggests that these networks
transfer emotional information across individuals and that connectivity
of this network is essential for vicarious experiences (concordance be-
tween objective and subjective measures of bodily arousal). We propose
that measures of autonomic mimicry, along with these system hubs,
may provide an implicit index of interoceptive ability related to auto-
nomic fluctuations.
In the first part of NMEC (Fig. 3), we have described how the intra-
individual coupling between partners’ amygdala and HPA axis under-
pins autonomic mimicry. Yet, the synchrony of autonomic signals
(heart rate, skin conductance, pupil diameter and hormonal expression)
is not sufficient for emotional contagion to occur. This is because
emotions have at least two fundamental dimensions: the arousal level
(intensity) and the valence level (Russell, 1978). In a recent review,
Wood et al. (2016) argued that in order to recognize facial expressions,
humans must integrate several perceptual and contextual inputs at
once. This is because modalities of perceptual input (auditory, visual,
tactile and olfactory) are often incomplete, and the brain needs to
generate predictions by integrating information from other modalities
(Driver and Noesselt, 2008). For example, increased facial redness and
sweating may be interpreted as either positive or negative, depending
on additional visual input (e.g., facial expression). In this way, visual
input from one sensory modality can affect the perception of another
modality (Wood et al., 2016). While autonomic mimicry communicates
intensity (the arousal level) of observed emotion, the motor movement
of facial expression and gestures provides visual input that helps ob-
servers to label the increase in physiological arousal with the appro-
priate emotional valence. In other words, by pairing physiological
synchrony with motor synchrony, emotional meaning can be trans-
ferred from one individual to another.
7.2. NMEC: the motor mimicry pathway (Fig. 4)
Apart from synchrony of autonomic arousal, another mechanism
that plays a fundamental role in emotional contagion is the mirror
neuron system (Gallese, 2005; Iacoboni, 2009; Likowski et al., 2012;
Nummenmaa et al., 2008). The second part of the NMEC (see Fig. 4)
depicts neurological pathways of the MNS through which motor signals
can be registered. In humans, the MNS system is a neural network
connecting several brain areas including the inferior parietal lobe (IPL),
the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and the superior temporal sulcus (STS;
Dinstein et al., 2007; Iacoboni, 2009). The regions of the MNS are as-
sumed to contain ‘mirror’ neurons similar to those studied in analogous
regions in macaque monkeys (Rizzolatti et al., 1996). In the macaque
monkey, the mirror neurons in the ventral premotor area (F5) re-
sponded both when the monkey executed a specific movement and
when the monkey observed performing that same movement (Di
Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). However, the MNS
system is also activated when goal-directed hand movements are per-
formed (Di et al., 1992). Interestingly, apart from one's own hand
movements, the MNS is also activated when people observe others
enacting object or non-object- related actions made with the mouth,
hand or foot (Buccino et al., 2001; Grafton et al., 1996) or only imagine
that someone is performing a motor action (Grafton et al., 1996).
Movements in a partner's face are registered in the superior tem-
poral sulcus (STS), a multisensory area which activates when observing
biological motion (Iacoboni, 2009). From the STS, motor information is
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transferred to the inferior parietal lobe (IPL; BA 39,40) and then to the
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; Brodmann's Area 45/44/6); (Carr et al.,
2003). The IFG region is an important region in social cognition as it
codes for the ‘goal of the action’ (Gazzola et al., 2006). These goal-
directed motor plans are then sent back to the IPL and the STS (Carr
et al., 2003). Cattaneo et al. (2010) provided convincing neurobeha-
vioral evidence for mirror neurons contribution to cognition by means
of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). In this experiment, blind-
folded participants repeated an object- directed action (push or pull).
When participants categorized others’ actions, this resulted in visual
after-effect, as a result of motor-to-visual adaptation (of mirror neu-
rons). TMS over the ventral premotor cortex suppressed the after-effect.
These data are consistent with the existence of premotor mirror neu-
rones that have access to the action meaning in humans.
In the past decades, the MNS has attracted scientific attention as it
has been suggested that, in addition to motor imitation, the MNS also
supports social functions (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Keysers and
Gazzola, 2010; Rizzolatti et al., 2009). Specifically, since the same
neural networks are involved in motor production and observation, it
has been theorized that the MNS may play a critical role in empathy as
it allows for feedback from facial and bodily actions that simulation
reflects on the emotions of others.
7.3. Anterior insula connecting the MNS and the emotion systems
A key neural structure believed to connect the mirror neuron system
with the emotion system is the anterior insula (Carr et al., 2003). The
anterior insula has been implicated in playing a role in the perception
and experience of pain (Jackson et al., 2006a; Mutschler et al., 2013).
Apart from vicarious physical pain, the AI is also associated with feel-
ings of embarrassment or social pain (Krach et al., 2011). The anterior
insula is structurally and functionally coupled to limbic structures in-
cluding the amygdala (Augustine, 1996). For this reason, the AI has
been proposed to be the neural structure connecting the mirror neuron
system with the emotion systems in empathy. Carr et al. (2003) showed
in an fMRI study that activation of the AI correlated with activity in the
premotor cortex, IFG and AMG and all areas associated with emotional
contagion, as demonstrated in numerous empathy reviews (Decety,
2010; Gazzola et al., 2006; Iacoboni, 2009). Interestingly, in Jackson
et al.’s (2006a,b) fMRI experiment, subjects were presented with people
in a painful situation and instructed to imagine perceiving the pain
from first and second person perspectives. The first perspective of pain
led to increased pain ratings as well as increased activation in the so-
matosensory cortex, the ACC and the insula. Taking the perspective of
others increased activation in the precuneus and the right TPJ, areas
involved in theory of mind and mentalizing. These results indicate that
perceptions of pain processed in the insula, as well as in the ACC, re-
present self-centered experiences, while the TPJ and the precuneus play
a role in self-other discrimination, which are crucial aspects of human
empathy.
The aforementioned reviewed literature suggests that empathy is, in
part, based on shared brain-to-brain coupling of affective states. While
previous reviews have clarified that neural pathways are involved in
the detection of subtle emotional signals in a partner's face and body
(Hasson et al., 2012; Kret, 2015; Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010) and
that other reviews have addressed the neural underpinnings of motor
imitation (Ferrari et al., 2005; Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti et al., 2001),
we here propose a new model that incorporates these neurological ac-
counts into one interactive emotional contagion model. In addition,
NMEC accounts for how the sender's nonverbal facial characteristics
(movements/autonomic responses) lead to brain-to-brain coupling and
mimicry between the partner's emotion system (limbic system and HPA
axis) and the mirror neuron system (IFG, IPL, STS). Both motor mimicry
and the autonomic mimicry indicate a high level of neural coupling
between these areas, where autonomic mimicry contributes to the in-
tensity of communicative signals and motor mimicry frames the
expression with the appropriate emotional valence. Consequently, by
combining autonomic and motor signals, people can extract affective
meaning from a partner's face. Disrupted emotion processing has been
related to a range of mental disorders and can possibly explain the high
comorbidity between mental disorders. Kret and Ploeger (2015) re-
ported evidence for disrupted emotion processing in anxiety disorders,
mood disorders, schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorder, borderline
personality disorder and eating disorders. Multiple measures of auto-
matic autonomic mimicry, along with motor mimicry early after birth,
could be used as developmental markers of social deficits. If true, pe-
diatrics could intervene early to substantially reduce the adverse
symptoms of these disorders.
8. Discussion
The current review provides an overreaching overview of studies
spanning across developmental psychology, social sociology, evolu-
tionary biology and neuroscience, supporting the notion that automatic
mimicry is essential for the development of empathy. The literature
indicates that people are generally not consciously aware of subtle
changes in an interaction partner's face and do not voluntarily react to
these changes (Dimberg et al., 2000; Tamietto and Castelli, 2009;
Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010; Wood et al., 2016). Yet, infants, as well
as adults, automatically mimic facial expressions as well as autonomic
signals from their partner's face or body and by doing so enhance their
understanding of the other's feelings, emotions, intentions and actions.
Automatic mimicry has here been proposed as a potential mechanism
that allows humans to recognize and empathize with other's emotions
(Buck, 1980). In theory, automatic mimicry of the perceived affective
signals, in turn, simulates further neural systems involved in the cor-
responding emotional state, which helps observers to implicitly infer
the expresser's internal state (Wood et al., 2016). This is an evolu-
tionary adaptive skill for organisms to survive and thrive by detecting
unconditioned signals of emotionality or arousal. Nevertheless, causal
evidence for this hypothesis remains controversial. The above reviewed
literature provides a unique and novel inside the possible function and
underlying mechanisms of mimicry.
Building upon Preston and de Waal’s (2002) perception-action
model, we showed that strong synchronization exists between two
people. We argued that automatic mimicry provides a physical-cogni-
tive link during an organism's development and is a precursor of
healthy social development. To support this argument, we demon-
strated that emotional contagion can occur at different levels of pro-
cessing. We reviewed well established, as well as recent, studies in-
troducing several physiological mechanisms of automatic mimicry
through which affective information can be shared. The presently re-
viewed literature implies that people mimic both autonomic and motor
expressions (Dimberg et al., 2000; Niedenthal et al., 2001; Tia et al.,
2011; Gregory and Webster, 1996; Webb, 1969; Helt et al., 2010;
Goldin-Meadow and Alibali, 2013; Estow et al., 2007). Special attention
has been given to autonomic mimicry, which is an underexplored area
of current emotional contagion research. The “autonomic mimicry”
involves synchrony in heart rate (Feldman, 2011), breathing rhythms
(Creaven et al., 2014; van Puyvelde et al., 2015), pupil diameter
(Fawcett et al., 2016; Kret et al., 2015; Kret and de Dreu, 2017) and
hormonal levels (Laurent et al., 2012; Saxbe et al., 2014). Psychophy-
siological research indicates that strong autonomic mimicry exists be-
tween mothers and neonates and that this physiological association
translates to psycho- emotional interactions between the pair. While
autonomic mimicry is generally a positive marker promoting attach-
ment, if the mother is in distress, physiological synchrony can actually
have negative consequences on the child's social development. This
supports the argument that physiological alignments allow for the di-
rect transfer of affective information from one individual to another and
thus facilitates implicit emotional communication.
Summarizing the newest discoveries in social neuroscience, we
E. Prochazkova, M.E. Kret Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 80 (2017) 99–114
110
explained that mimicry is likely to be a result of overlapping neural
networks. We proposed a new “Neurocognitive Model of Emotional
Contagion”. At its core, NMEC illustrates how complex processes, such
as empathy, might emerge from automatic mimicry of conspecifics. We
argued that while shared neural activation and automatic mimicry re-
flect the degree to which people internally simulate perceived emo-
tional states, it is the emotional signals – not the mimicry – that drive
the common patterns of neural representations that underlie empathy.
We proposed that emotions are communicated via various commu-
nicative channels (Figs. 1 and 2) and the degree of mimicry and brain-
to-brain coupling (Figs. 3 and 4) corresponds to the level the receiver is
able to “tune in” to one or more of these communicative channels.
Therefore, measurements of several types of mimicries at once would
provide a more holistic physiological profile of the level to which one
individual understands/processes another individual's social signal.
Especially useful, might be measures of autonomic signals that are not
likely to be influenced by learning, social interactions or conscious
control (Kret, 2015). In line with this hypothesis, there is an increasing
interest in how mimicry may underlie social deficits in social disorders
(Duffy and Chartrand, 2015). Still, to what extent mimicry is necessary
for healthy social development remains inconclusive. Considering the
potential role of automatic mimicry in social pathologies, we propose
that future research should measure the mimicry of emotional signals
on the different level of expression.
9. Future directions
The topics of motor mimicry and especially autonomic mimicry are
very new and as of yet, still underexplored. Therefore, the first step in
future studies is to conduct longitudinal studies whereby automatic
mimicry will be continuously measured throughout a child's develop-
ment (Feldman et al., 2014). While most previous studies measured
automatic mimicry during virtual interactions, a study of mimicry
during real-life interactions is highly recommended to provide real-life
implications. Importantly, multiple measurements of emotional signals
(e.g., facial muscles, eye gaze, pupil-size, blushing and body postures)
are needed to measure several processes underpinning emotional con-
tagion during social interactions. Apart from behavioral experiments,
future studies may combine neurological techniques (EEG, fMRI) with
physiological measures and try to block mimicry in order to shed light
on how different forms of mimicries are represented in the brain.
Neuroimaging analyses should be hypothesis driven and make use of
functional connectivity analysis and dynamic neural network modeling
in order to make sense of social cognition as an interactive system.
An alternative way to tackle the correspondence problem of mi-
micry is to study mimicry in robots. The possibility that empathy can be
generated by sensorimotor processes in robots has already excited the
cognitive science community. This is because artificial systems provide
the benefit of a blank state in which neuroscientific theories of brain
functions can be tested (de Kleijn et al., 2015). With robots, researchers
can carefully manipulate parameters in a controlled way. There is
evidence showing that if robots mimic another person's affective ac-
tions, this automatically activates a motor representation and affective
experience in the human that is coherent with the robot's affective
expression (Hofree et al., 2015; Li and Chignell, 2011; Mayer et al.,
2010). Similarly, as in human-to-human interactions, research shows
that during human-robot interactions, humans perceive robots that
mimic as more positive and empathic (Fuente et al., 2015; Hofree et al.,
2015). Hypothetically, if automatic mimicry would allow for affective
representations to be manifested in a robot, it would confirm the theory
that mimicry is sufficient for emotional contagion to emerge (Asada,
2015). By developing robots that can detect subtle social signals and
exhibit mimicry, we could then test whether robots start to develop
social behavior similar to humans. In the future, brain-inspired algo-
rithms and computational models of neural networks (e.g., simulations
of neural microcircuits, connectionist networks) could provide well-
controlled mimicry parameters for social cognitive models (Asada et al.,
2001; Watanabe et al., 2007). The application of the NMEC in robots in
future studies may provide evidence to refute or support the hypothesis
that automatic mimicry is necessary for empathy development.
10. Conclusion
In conclusion, the current review argues that automatic mimicry is
essential for the development of healthy social cognition. The current
review provided an interdisciplinary approach to the study of human
cognitive developmental. Through the integration of information from
social neuroscience evolutionary biology, this review provided a fresh
view and new insight into the development of human cognitive func-
tions utilizing synthetic and constructive approach.
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